Democracia sin atajos: cognitivamente exigente pero participativamente austera
In this text, three criticisms of Democracy without Shortcuts (2020), by Cristina Lafont, are developed. In the first place, it is argued that this work formulates an ideal of doxastic justification of laws that is cognitively very demanding for the common citizen and fails to consider the virtuous...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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2023
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| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8990915 |
| Source: | Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 55, 2023 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Edición Especial), pags. 57-85 |
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| Summary: |
In this text, three criticisms of Democracy without Shortcuts (2020), by Cristina Lafont, are developed. In the first place, it is argued that this work formulates an ideal of doxastic justification of laws that is cognitively very demanding for the common citizen and fails to consider the virtuous side of deference to epistemic authorities and suspensions of judgment. Second, by asking the citizen not only to (rationally) “endorse”, but also to “identify” herself with the laws that bind her, introduces a vector of tension in practice, since the psychological motivations for identification may differ – and in fact differ – with the motivations to rationally support a political decision. Finally, it is argued that the institution of judicial review is incapable of forging the appropriate incentives to achieve the enlightened endorsement of the majority of the population subject to the laws, and that other participatory institutions – such as citizen referendum initiatives – would be more efficient in that goal. |
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