Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
The article challenges Arthur Ripstein’s theses on the place of private law (and tort law in particular) in John Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Ripstein, Rawls’ theory of justice grants private law a certain independence by exempting it from the distributive injunctions of the principles cho...
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2021
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| Source: | Revista chilena de derecho privado, ISSN 0718-0233, Nº. 37, 2021, pags. 85-104 |
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Revista chilena de derecho privado, ISSN 0718-0233, Nº. 37, 2021, pags. 85-104
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tort law
Rawls Ripstein distributive justice corrective justice derecho de daños Rawls Ripstein justicia distributiva justicia correctiva |
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tort law
Rawls Ripstein distributive justice corrective justice derecho de daños Rawls Ripstein justicia distributiva justicia correctiva Martins Zanitelli, Leandro Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein |
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The article challenges Arthur Ripstein’s theses on the place of private law (and tort law in particular) in John Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Ripstein, Rawls’ theory of justice grants private law a certain independence by exempting it from the distributive injunctions of the principles chosen in the original position. This conclusion has two bases, one negative and the other positive. On the negative side of the argument, Ripstein claims that Rawls’ original position does not lend itself to guiding the design of institutions, especially those institutions with a deontological structure such as tort law. On the positive side, Ripstein resorts to the idea of a division of responsibility between citizens and social institutions (an idea that Rawls presents in “Social Unity and Primary Goods”) to demonstrate Rawls’ commitment to a pre-institutional conception of ownership and to the independence of private law that would ensue. The article argues that Ripstein is wrong in neglecting the role of the original position and the principles chosen in that position and exaggerates the consequences for private law of the division of responsibility between citizens and institutions.
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Article
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| author |
Martins Zanitelli, Leandro
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| author_facet |
Martins Zanitelli, Leandro
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Martins Zanitelli, Leandro
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| title |
Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
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| title_short |
Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
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| title_full |
Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
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| title_fullStr |
Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
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Rawls and tort law: A critique of Ripstein
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| title_sort |
rawls and tort law: a critique of ripstein
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2021
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8327688
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1727763485288300544
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00015185502022-03-18Rawls and tort law: A critique of RipsteinMartins Zanitelli, Leandrotort lawRawlsRipsteindistributive justicecorrective justicederecho de dañosRawlsRipsteinjusticia distributivajusticia correctivaThe article challenges Arthur Ripstein’s theses on the place of private law (and tort law in particular) in John Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Ripstein, Rawls’ theory of justice grants private law a certain independence by exempting it from the distributive injunctions of the principles chosen in the original position. This conclusion has two bases, one negative and the other positive. On the negative side of the argument, Ripstein claims that Rawls’ original position does not lend itself to guiding the design of institutions, especially those institutions with a deontological structure such as tort law. On the positive side, Ripstein resorts to the idea of a division of responsibility between citizens and social institutions (an idea that Rawls presents in “Social Unity and Primary Goods”) to demonstrate Rawls’ commitment to a pre-institutional conception of ownership and to the independence of private law that would ensue. The article argues that Ripstein is wrong in neglecting the role of the original position and the principles chosen in that position and exaggerates the consequences for private law of the division of responsibility between citizens and institutions.El artículo cuestiona las tesis de Arthur Ripstein sobre el lugar del derecho privado (y, en particular, del derecho de daños) en la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls. Según Ripstein, la teoría de la justicia de Rawls otorga al derecho privado una cierta independencia, al no someterlo a los mandatos distributivos de los principios elegidos en la posición original. Esta conclusión tiene dos bases, una negativa y otra positiva. En el lado negativo del argumento, Ripstein afirma que la posición original de Rawls no se presta a guiar el diseño de instituciones, especialmente instituciones, como la ley de responsabilidad civil, con una estructura deontológica. En el lado positivo, Ripstein recurre a la idea de una división de responsabilidades entre ciudadanos e instituciones sociales (idea que Rawls presenta en el artículo Social Unity and Primary Goods) para demostrar el compromiso de Rawls con una concepción preinstitucional de propiedad y con la independencia del derecho privado que se derivaría. El artículo sostiene que Ripstein se equivoca al descuidar el papel de la posición original y los principios elegidos en esa posición, así como exagera las consecuencias para el derecho privado de la división de responsabilidades entre ciudadanos e instituciones.2021text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8327688(Revista) ISSN 0718-0233Revista chilena de derecho privado, ISSN 0718-0233, Nº. 37, 2021, pags. 85-104engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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