Interpretación constitucional, control judicial de la ley y desacuerdos

ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have traditionally held that the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation depends partially on the existence of right answers in the interpretation of constitutional rights, and that the skeptical positions on the indeterminacy of the constitution also imply several o...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Buriticá Arango, Esteban
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7258796
Source:Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 46, Nº. 3, 2019, pags. 869-891
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Summary: ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have traditionally held that the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation depends partially on the existence of right answers in the interpretation of constitutional rights, and that the skeptical positions on the indeterminacy of the constitution also imply several objections to the judicial review of legislation. In this paper it is explained that this thesis is wrong and that actually the semantic or metathetic theories of the meaning of constitutional clauses scarcely contribute, in contexts of reasonable disagreements, to the theories about the legitimacy of any procedure of judicial review.