Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
The present paper pursues two objectives. First, it tries to show that the way of conceiving the Principle of Innocence depends on the conception of moral obligation that is adopted. This linkage between both conceptions has not been explored in the specialized literature. The paper attempts to corr...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Published: |
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6126292 |
| Source: | Ars Boni et Aequi, ISSN 0719-2568, Vol. 13, Nº. 1, 2017, pags. 159-187 |
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| Summary: |
The present paper pursues two objectives. First, it tries
to show that the way of conceiving the Principle of Innocence depends
on the conception of moral obligation that is adopted. This
linkage between both conceptions has not been explored in the
specialized literature. The paper attempts to correct this de!cit.
Secondly, and once the link between both conceptions is established,
it is argued for a particular conception of moral obligation.
Speci!cally, several reasons are offered in favor of the prospective
variant. Finally, this leads to the conclusion that the correct conception
of the Principle of Innocence is that correlated with the prospective
conception of moral obligation. |
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