Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

dialnet-ar-18-ART0001083518

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Criminalidad, ISSN 1794-3108, Vol. 51, Nº. 1, 2009, pags. 209-223

Spanish

alcalde
armas
legislación
Estado
inconstitucionalidad
policía civil
major
guns
legislation
State
unconstitutionality
civil police

alcalde
armas
legislación
Estado
inconstitucionalidad
policía civil
major
guns
legislation
State
unconstitutionality
civil police
Caballero Montejo, Gustavo Adolfo
Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

All States coincide in monopolizing firearms in order to defend sovereignty, to guarantee independence and territorial integrity, and to fully embrace security of all citizens. Some countries such as Colombia, México and Venezuela set such principles in their constitutions. The 1991 Constitution sustained the supremacy of the executive branch in order to maintain public order, thus getting closer to a federal scheme; and set the postulates of a new order: a municipality is a basic autonomous entity as are its authorities; a mayor is the person responsible for public order and coexistence in his/her territory as chief police officer. The latter does not hold a legal status, and it is only sustained judicially by the Consejo de Estado from an administrative viewpoint. This issue has not deeply been covered by experts as there was no need to. However, sociopolitical circumstances that developed at the end of last century demand a thorough study to appropriately define the powers of majors as chief police officers. Our constitution coheres the executive branch with security and coexistence. The first holds the president as the main figure; the latter holds the president as the main actor. The Constitution, by granting mayors the responsibility to preserve public order in their territory and the status of chief police officers, allows them to order temporary disarmament of citizens, acting independently from the central government, for national security purposes; - and for such purposes - they hold the monopoly to control and market fire weapons, and grant citizens permits to carry them. Yet, decree 2535, dated 1993, which has the reach of an act - the legal regulator on the matter - violates the Constitution and juridical logic since it subordinates the mayors’ will to the discretional decision made by a military officer. In such an interim, the state has fallen prey to the game of waiting for the disarmament campaigns to bring about more results than the control activities themselves do, not being aware that by doing so the State debases itself - by blurring the role of the ruler -, loses its monopoly, and propitiates corruption in the midst of its security forces.

Article

Caballero Montejo, Gustavo Adolfo

Caballero Montejo, Gustavo Adolfo

Caballero Montejo, Gustavo Adolfo

Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarme

2009

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5764201

1709744961314881536

dialnet-ar-18-ART00010835182017-01-03Reflexiones sobre seguridad, convivencia y desarmeCaballero Montejo, Gustavo AdolfoalcaldearmaslegislaciónEstadoinconstitucionalidadpolicía civilmajorgunslegislationStateunconstitutionalitycivil policeAll States coincide in monopolizing firearms in order to defend sovereignty, to guarantee independence and territorial integrity, and to fully embrace security of all citizens. Some countries such as Colombia, México and Venezuela set such principles in their constitutions. The 1991 Constitution sustained the supremacy of the executive branch in order to maintain public order, thus getting closer to a federal scheme; and set the postulates of a new order: a municipality is a basic autonomous entity as are its authorities; a mayor is the person responsible for public order and coexistence in his/her territory as chief police officer. The latter does not hold a legal status, and it is only sustained judicially by the Consejo de Estado from an administrative viewpoint. This issue has not deeply been covered by experts as there was no need to. However, sociopolitical circumstances that developed at the end of last century demand a thorough study to appropriately define the powers of majors as chief police officers. Our constitution coheres the executive branch with security and coexistence. The first holds the president as the main figure; the latter holds the president as the main actor. The Constitution, by granting mayors the responsibility to preserve public order in their territory and the status of chief police officers, allows them to order temporary disarmament of citizens, acting independently from the central government, for national security purposes; - and for such purposes - they hold the monopoly to control and market fire weapons, and grant citizens permits to carry them. Yet, decree 2535, dated 1993, which has the reach of an act - the legal regulator on the matter - violates the Constitution and juridical logic since it subordinates the mayors’ will to the discretional decision made by a military officer. In such an interim, the state has fallen prey to the game of waiting for the disarmament campaigns to bring about more results than the control activities themselves do, not being aware that by doing so the State debases itself - by blurring the role of the ruler -, loses its monopoly, and propitiates corruption in the midst of its security forces.Internacionalmente, coinciden los Estados en monopolizar las armas de fuego para defender la soberanía, garantizar la independencia e integridad territorial y dar plena vigencia a la seguridad ciudadana. Algunos, como Colombia, México y Venezuela, inscriben este principio en las reglas constitucionales. El constituyente de 1991 conservó la línea del poder ejecutivo para los efectos de mantener el orden público -acercándose en la forma a un esquema federal- y fijó los postulados del nuevo orden: el municipio es entidad básica; este y sus autoridades son autónomos; el alcalde es responsable del orden público y la convivencia en su territorio como jefe de policía. Esta última noción no tiene un desarrollo legal acorde, y solo se explica jurisprudencialmente por el Consejo de Estado, desde la perspectiva de policía administrativa. El tema no ha sido objeto de estudio por doctrinantes, pues no existía la necesidad de abordarlo. Sin embargo, las circunstancias sociopolíticas desarrolladas desde finales del siglo pasado exigen que empecemos a incursionar para deslindar con propiedad las atribuciones del alcalde como jefe de policía. La Carta política imbrica al poder ejecutivo con la seguridad y la convivencia. En la primera, el presidente es la figura esencial; en la segunda, emerge el burgomaestre como protagonista. Al otorgarse al alcalde, por la Constitución, la responsabilidad para conservar el orden público en su territorio y la calidad de jefe de policía, puede ordenar el desarme temporal de sus gobernados, independientemente de que el gobierno central, por razones de seguridad nacional -y para esos fines-, tenga el monopolio de controlar y comerciar las armas de fuego, y otorgar permisos para portarlas. Empero, el decreto con fuerza de ley número 2535 de 1993 -regulador legal de la materia- violenta la Constitución y la lógica jurídica, porque supedita la voluntad del burgomaestre a la decisión discrecional de un oficial militar. En ese intervalo el Estado ha caído en el juego de esperar que las campañas propagandísticas de desarme produzcan más resultados que la actividad de control, sin percatarse que ello lo envilece, desdibuja el rol de gobernante, pierde el monopolio y propicia la corrupción de las fuerzas de seguridad.2009text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5764201(Revista) ISSN 1794-3108Criminalidad, ISSN 1794-3108, Vol. 51, Nº. 1, 2009, pags. 209-223spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. 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