Derecho de defensa, inmoralidad e injusticia
The adversarial system of adjudication and the right of defense are morally justified (Fiss, 1999), however, from a critical role of the lawyer (cf. Kennedy, 1986) it has been said that the one who agrees defending an immoral cause commits itself an immoral action (Rivera Lopez, 2010). By the method...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores
2011
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| Online Access: | http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=3956712 |
| Source: | Revista Via Iuris, ISSN 1909-5759, Nº. 11, 2011, pags. 79-88 |
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| Summary: |
The adversarial system of adjudication and the right
of defense are morally justified (Fiss, 1999), however,
from a critical role of the lawyer (cf. Kennedy,
1986) it has been said that the one who agrees defending
an immoral cause commits itself an immoral
action (Rivera Lopez, 2010). By the method of
logical and conceptual analysis, this work defends
the idea that it is not morally wrong, as a lawyer,
to accept the defense of a client who claims not to
be condemned, regardless of whether or not to be
condemned. The argument rests on the distinction
between action that should make the client and the
action to defend themselves in court. The conclusion
of this work is that this distinction allows to argue
that the act of accepting the defense of a client
is not immoral, but there may be moral reasons to
refrain from defending it. |
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