Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última
Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen�s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart�s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to th...
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4065118 |
| Fuente: | Seqüência: estudos jurídicos e políticos, ISSN 2177-7055, Vol. 33, Nº. 64, 2012, pags. 39-56 |
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| Sumario: |
Throughout his very extensive
work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the
two main versions of the concept of a legally
ultimate norm: Kelsen�s concept of the basic
or fundamental norm and the Hart�s concept
of the rule of recognition. In relation to the
concept of the basic norm as in relation to the
concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has
argued in some texts that they are absolutely
necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these
concepts are not only unnecessary but also
inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination
would benefit the resulting theory of
law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate
a concept of a legally ultimate norm.
Moreover, in the author�s view, Bobbio�s
propos als to abandon the two main versions of
this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable
from interpretations which deal with
them in a clearly misguided way in the case of
the concept of rule of recognition and which
are for various reasons not acceptable in the
case of the concept of basic norm. |
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