La facultad indagatoria de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación: una revisión

The aim of this article is to explore the legal and factual background of article 97 of the Federal Constitution, which has been traditionally based upon idealistic presumptions rather than upon academic standards. The author posits two theses. The first one, which he calls "critical", examines the... Deskribapen osoa

Egile nagusia: Reyes Reyes, Pablo Enrique
Formatua: Artikulua
Hizkuntza: Gaztelania
Argitaratua: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas 2003
Sarrera elektronikoa: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=306741
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Laburpena: The aim of this article is to explore the legal and factual background of article 97 of the Federal Constitution, which has been traditionally based upon idealistic presumptions rather than upon academic standards. The author posits two theses. The first one, which he calls "critical", examines the current dominant theory which is supported by some of the most prestigious scholars, and is based on the foundations to amparo. These foundations, the author suggests, are not entirely applicable to the inquiries held by the Supreme Court. The second thesis, called "constructivist", from which the author finds the genesis to the abovementioned article 97. It is posited that international conventions to which Mexico is signatory since the late 19th century gave rise to think that it was appropriate to empower the Supreme Court to hold factual inquiries on gross violations to civil and political liberties. Finally, the author concludes that the more democratic the country becomes, the less likely is that the Supreme Court holds inquiries on violations to human rights.